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Abstract 
This paper calculates the cost per tonne of CO2 abated by Sizewell B (SZB, the nuclear power 
station commissioned in 1995). Other zero-carbon renewables received contractual support. A 
long-term Contract-for-Difference (CfD) is modelled with a strike price reset every 5 yrs. by the 
regulator under the Regulatory Asset Base model of electric utilities. The answer depends on the 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC), given the range of observed utility WACCs. At a 
low WACC the cost is £201934.1/tonne CO2 abated and £201949.2/t. CO2 at the high WACC, 
compared with the roughly £40/t. CO2 paid by GB generators in 2019. Had the design for SZB 
been replicated for the 6.4 GW new nuclear the saving might have been £9-18 billion. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The UK has now committed itself to Net Zero by 2050, and various bodies, such as the 
Commission on Climate Change and the National Infrastructure Commission are publishing 
pathways for the energy sector to meet that target (CCC, 2019a, b; NIC, 2020a). Considerable 
uncertainties are highlighted with important differences in possible pathways to net zero. 
Heating is recognised to be one, where the two extreme options are to decarbonise natural gas 
to hydrogen by Steam Methane Reforming (SMR) with Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS), 
or to electrify using heat pumps. The hydrogen pathway could use the existing gas pipeline 
system and (slightly modified) existing equipment in buildings, while electrification requires 
massive investment in heat pumps as well as a considerable expansion of the electricity 
system. The other major choice, or rather, the optimal balance, is between renewable 
electricity, nuclear power and/or CCS (including Bio-energy CCS, or BECCS, which can 
absorb CO2 and thus offset unavoidable emissions). 
Almost without exception, where these reports give costs, they do not draw attention 
to the cost of financing the investments (the Weighted Average Cost of Capital, WACC), and 
where they do the default assumption appears to be that these will be financed at the kinds of 
hurdle rates used by private companies investing in a liberalised electricity market. Thus the 
National Infrastructure Commission assumes almost all WACCS at around 9% real (NIC, 
2020b). However, one characteristic shared by all zero and low-carbon energy technologies is 
that they are very capital intensive, so the cost of capital is a main determinant of their life-
time costs. With the exception of CCS and SMR hydrogen, operating costs are low, further 
amplifying the role of the WACC in determining cost. This might not matter if the trajectory 
merely quantifies the annual rates of expenditure (investment and operating costs) as is 
common in the summary reports, but it can matter when choosing the best portfolio of 
techniques to deliver the target. This paper will argue that the tendency to assume high hurdle 
rates is both damaging (in exaggerating the costs of decarbonisation), potentially dangerous 
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(in the choice of techniques) and unnecessary, in that there are better methods of financing 
such investments that dramatically reduce the WACC. 
So what should the WACC be for investments to mitigate damaging climate change? 
The Stern Report (Stern, 2007) lays out the arguments for a low social discount rate of 1.4% 
(real). It logically follows that the social discount rate should be used not only to measure the 
damage caused by releasing CO2 now, but should also be the rate used to discount the future 
benefits of zero-carbon generation investments that avoid damaging CO2 emissions. (There 
are additional arguments relating to risk and distributional concerns that strengthen the case 
for a low rate discussed in Newbery et al., 2019.)  
The UK Government’s Appraisal Manual (The Green Book, HMT, 2018) follows the 
same utilitarian public economics theory that guided the estimates of the discount rate in the 
Stern Report. It sets out the principles of social cost-benefit analysis for appraising projects 
whose private returns are likely to understate their social benefits. That is pre-eminently the 
case with investments in zero-carbon technologies to mitigate climate change. The rate used 
for long-term discounting by the UK Government was reduced after the Stern Report from 
2.5% for projects lasting 75+ years to 2.14% (HMT, 2018, p104). That suggests a discount 
rate or WACC of 3% should not be too high.  
In an earlier project, the author and colleagues demonstrated the importance of the 
WACC in financing new nuclear power plants (Newbery et al., 2019). That was, however, a 
prospective analysis based on assumptions about future fuel, carbon and electricity prices. It 
therefore seems timely to conduct an ex post social cost-benefit analysis of a past nuclear 
power station (Sizewell B, on the east coast of Britain) to ask whether it was a cost-effective 
way of decarbonising. This is particularly important as the standard argument against nuclear 
power (other than dread of massive accidents, and its association with the bomb) is that it is 
too expensive compared to the now rapidly falling costs of renewables. This paper will look 
at a particularly expensive example ─ the first and only one of its kind in the UK ─ and argue 
against that view, based on a tried and tested method of lowering the WACC. 
1. THE HISTORY OF BRITISH NUCLEAR AMBITIONS AND SIZEWELL B 
Before privatization, the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB, the state-
owned generation and transmission company for England and Wales) had an ambitious plan 
to build a fleet of nuclear power stations on the Sizewell B model. In the opening words of 
the PIU2 (2002) study: 
  
 “Nuclear power and the various forms of renewable energy are the two main virtually 
zero carbon electricity supply options. Even if UK energy efficiency is improved 
dramatically, new electricity supply options will be needed on a significant scale as 
older stations of all types are retired. In a world constrained to achieve major carbon 
emission reductions, nuclear power and renewables assume particular importance. 
 
2 The Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU) was set up by the Cabinet Secretary in 1998. “Senior 
officials and ministers, including the Prime Minister, believed that Government needed to rebuild its 
capacity to do long-term thinking and strategic policy work.” (See 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmpubadm/262/2071103.htm ) 
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The contribution that each could make to the UK energy mix is potentially large – but 
strictly limited if current market conditions alone determine investment choices. 
Renewables are mostly embryonic technologies with costs higher than gas-based 
alternatives, especially combined cycle gas-turbines (CCGTs). Nuclear power is a 
more mature technology, though also not currently competitive as a new investment 
option.” 
Sizewell B was the first, and so far the only Pressurised Water Reactor (PWR) 
commissioned in the UK, and its approval took one of the longest and costliest public 
inquiries to be held. Starting in 1982 under the chairman, Sir Frank Layfield, it finally 
reported in early 1987. The proposal was accepted by the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate, 
and the project was approved. Construction started by the CEGB in 1987, but the CEGB was 
unbundled and its fossil generation (and grid) were privatized in 1989. Sizewell B (and the 
other nuclear stations) remained in public ownership in Nuclear Electric until 1996, and the 
station was commissioned and first synchronised with the national grid on 14 Feb 1995. 
2. CALCULATING THE COST OF CO2 SAVED 
The cost of CO2 saved is the shortfall in revenue from the investment in the station 
compared with the reduction in CO2 emissions enabled. For that calculation we need to know 
the cost of the plant, the required return (WACC), the revenue from sales less the cost of 
operation, and the CO2 displaced compared to the counterfactual in which Sizewell B had not 
been built. Each step in the calculation requires assumptions, even if some of the elements are 
in principle known. Even the cost is problematic ─ should it include first of a kind costs 
(given that it was also the last of its kind)? In this paper we take the least favourable case of 
first of a kind costs (FOAK). Next, should the cost be uprated by the Retail Price Index (RPI) 
or the lower Consumer Price Index (CPI)? Here as we shall consider RAB financing by 
Ofgem, the normal estimate of the WACC used to be based on the RPI, but that measure of 
inflation is increasingly questioned and has been changed for the latest price controls to 
CPIH.3 Fortunately, the start date of the calculation is closer to the time of the cost estimates, 
reducing the potential index number discrepancies. 
To start first with the cost, for what should be an objective fact the available evidence 
is somewhat ambiguous. PIU (2002) stated that “In 2000 money, the construction cost was 
approximately £3000/kW including first of a kind costs, or around £2250/kW in their 
absence.” As we are interested in its value in 1995, when it was commissioned, we need to 
estimate its value in 1995 money. At the time the PIU wrote its report, the standard price 
 
3 The Consumer Price Index, CPI, (actually CPIH) was introduced as the Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP) in 1996 and later as the CPI, but even now successive estimates of the CPI 
before 2000 are alarmingly variable. As a measure of the problem of uprating prices, using the RPI 
from 1995 to 2019 the uprating factor is 1.94; using the CPIH, it is 1.62; and using the even less 
reliable construction index and piecing together at least three series, it is 2.54. The Office on National 
Statistics only took control of the construction series in 2015 and has since revised the methodology – 
see 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/businessindustryandtrade/constructionindustry/articles/interimsolutionforcons
tructionoutputpriceindices/ukjantomar2017#toc  
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index was the Retail Price Index (RPI) and using that, the cost would be approximately 
£19952,620/kW. 
Collier, who oversaw the construction of Sizewell B (SZB) as chairman of Nuclear 
Electric, reports that “the revised capital cost estimate in 1987 prices was £2030 million. The 
project was completed within this budget.” (Collier, 2015, p753). The follow-on plants would 
have cost less: “The development of the design cost was of the order of £700 M” (Collier, 
2015, p757). SZB delivers 1,198 MW to the grid, so the budgeted figure was therefore 
£19871,695/kW (with some uncertainty as subsequent costs were probably revalued at the RPI 
but we do not know the time pattern of expenditure). In 1995 prices again using the RPI this 
is £19952,480/kW. A simple average of the two is £19952,550/kW. 
Fortunately, we have reliable figures for output, kindly supplied by EdF. However, 
while the wholesale spot prices are observable, as a baseload inflexible plant with predictable 
refuelling cycles, its output would be sold on contract and for that we have no published data. 
However, in a cost-benefit study we are less interested in the financial transactions and 
instead need to know the cost of the electricity displaced. If markets were competitive (a 
major qualification before about 2000) the spot price might be a reasonable proxy for the 
marginal cost of electricity (although it ignores the contribution to capacity adequacy). We 
have daily spot price data (the Pool Purchasing Price from 1990-2001, thereafter the Market 
Index Price (MIDP) until ENTSO-E started publishing Day-Ahead Market (DAM) data on its 
Transparency website).   
 
FIGURE 1 
Hourly output and real (£2015) wholesale prices, monthly averages 
Source: Output from EdF, prices pre-2001: PPP from the Pool, post 2001: MIDP, later ENTSO-E  
 
Figure 1 shows the monthly averages of output and the relevant wholesale prices 
since Mar 1 1995 (shortly after first synchronising to the grid on 14 Feb 1995). The 
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cumulative average capacity factor was 84% from Oct 1995 to Dec 2019.  The output shows 
periodic outages for refuelling every 18 months and a major repair outage in 2010 after an 
incident due to problems with the pressuriser.4 Additional specialised staff were needed 
during such outages, as reported by Balfour Beatty for the 2012 statutory outage.5 For 
example, “The nuclear power station stopped generating electricity at the end of May 2019 as 
1,200 specialist workers joined the 800 workers on site for the £60 million outage project. 
The station is brought offline every 18 months where a third of the fuel is replaced in the 
reactor and thousands of maintenance jobs are completed during this work period.”6 
 
Figure 2 Average daily real sales value of output from Sizewell B (deflated by CPI) 
Source: as fig 1 
Figure 2 shows the daily sales value at the spot price (uprated by the CPI to 2015 
prices) from March 1995. 
2.1 Operating costs 
To compute the cost of CO2 saved we need to estimate the gross profit of running the 
plant and that requires estimating operating costs. These include the cost of running the 
station (personnel, which according to EdF includes “approximately 520 full time EDF 
Energy employees plus over 250 full time contract partners”,7 the fuel and other material 
costs, the cost of eventual decommissioning, the cost of repairs and maintenance, and the cost 
of the grid connection. As noted, the 2019 refuelling and maintenance cost £60 million. If 
such expenses occur every 18 months the average fixed cost of the workforce (at 
£50,000/employee-yr) and maintenance alone would be £64,000/MWyr, but this excludes 
materials and other overheads. 
 
4 "Sizewell B outage will extend into summer". Nuclear Engineering International. 11 June 2010. 
5 https://nrl.co.uk/beyond-recruitment/sizewell-b-statutory-outage-2012/  
6 https://www.eadt.co.uk/news/sizewell-b-refuelling-edf-energy-outage-1-6199326  
7 https://www.edfenergy.com/energy/power-station/daily-statuses 
6 
 
BEIS (2016a, Table 19) gives the fixed Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs for 
a FOAK PWR as £72,900/MWyr, the variable O&M as £5/MWh, insurance costs as 
£10,000/MWyr and connection and use of system as £500/MWyr. Appendix A suggests that 
compared to the average baseload power station, SZB has annual Transmission Network Use 
of System TNUoS) costs in £2015-4,000/MWyr (i.e. negative, the station is paid to generate in 
system peak hours), although from 1995 the cost has gradually decreased from 
£2015+1,000/MWyr to £2015-10,000/MWyr. The least favourable assumption would be to 
ignore this TNUoS benefit and set it to zero. Fuel and decommissioning costs are given as 
£6/MWh (BEIS, 2016a, Table 4). At SZB’s capacity factor of 7,350 hrs/yr. the fixed costs 
would average to £11/MWh, so total operating costs (including fuel) would be £201522/MWh.  
MIT (2018, table A5, p151, shown below in Appendix B) gives fixed O&M costs as 
$95,000 (£71,000)/MW, variable as $6.89 (£5.14)/MWh and fuel as $1.02(£0.76)/MWh. 
Averaging over 7,350 hours/yr. this gives £16/MWh. This is consistent with (and probably 
taken from), US EIA8 data. The average total cost is £201516.4/MWh, but this probably does 
not include decommissioning costs that might add £1-2/MWh. It thus seems reasonable to 
take an average operating cost as £201522/MWh.  
2.2 Financing Sizewell B 
Construction was started before the CEGB was privatized in 1989, and SZB remained 
in public ownership as part of the new company, Nuclear Electric, until it was privatized as 
British Energy in 1996. The approach here is to assume that after commissioning in 1995 
(just before its public sale) SZB is treated as a regulated asset like the similarly privatized 
transmission and distribution networks, and as has been proposed for a future Sizewell C 
under the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) model (Newbery et al., 2019). This requires an 
initial valuation of the RAB in 1995, taken as the full construction cost including first of a 
kind costs, to be depreciated over 35 years. (If, as might also be reasonable, it is depreciated 
over its lifetime of 60 years, the costs would of course be lower, so this is a cautious 
assumption.) 
If we assume that the Office of Electricity Regulation, Offer, later Ofgem, sets the 
price control every 5 years (coincidentally at the same time as the Distribution Price 
Controls) then we need to specify a suitable WACC. The return on the declining RAB at this 
WACC, with depreciation and allowed operating costs (Opex) determine the strike price for 
the Contract-for Difference (CfD). Consumers would then pay for the excess of the strike 
price over the market price: effectively they would be the counterparties to the CfD.  
Transmission and Distribution companies have been regulated by Ofgem under this 
model since 1990, and so we can construct a time series of relevant data from past regulatory 
decisions. These are shown where available in the right-hand two columns of Table 2. Note 
these are normally the vanilla rate, which Ofgem defines as “is the weighted average of the 
expected cost of debt (pre-tax) and the expected cost of equity (post tax) and is used in our 
modelling to determine allowed revenues.” The methodology for calculating the WACC and 
the treatment of tax has changed over the years, as has the assumed gearing, and in some 
cases the earlier price controls have been re-opened (mainly to address cost issues 
 
8 At https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_08_04.html  
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unconnected with the WACC). The figures have been culled from a variety of sources,9 some 
from consultation proposals that give a range, in which case the numbers have been averaged. 
The 1995 WACC and/or the RAB for the Distribution Companies were considered excessive 
and resulted in a merger wave and some resetting of the price control.  
The main change over the past 30 years has been in the real risk-free rate, as figure 3 
shows.  
 
FIGURE 3 
Risk-free real interest rate (5 and 10-yr maturity) 
Source: Bank of England UK yield curve data 
Note: The figure ends before the dramatic further declines caused by Covid-19 
 
An alternative approach would be to assume a constant Equity Risk Premium (ERP) of 4-6%, 
a debt premium of 1% (rising if the risk-free rate becomes negative), and a gearing of 55% or 
65%. If take as the risk-free rate the average of the previous 5 years of the 10-yr Bank of 
England indexed interest rate as in Figure 3, then Table 1 shows how to estimate the WACC 
at 5 year intervals from 1995. The choice of gearing is clearly a key determinant of the 
WACC and 65% may be considered high for a nuclear power station (Drax, a mixed coal and 
bio-mass station, has a gearing of 55%) but the nature of the RAB model is to de-risk returns 
allowing higher gearing. Note also that Ofgem have recently switched from RPI indexing to 
CPIH indexing, and the difference is about 1% (RPI higher). Our approach is to follow the 
Ofgem RPI methodology until 2020, and then switch to CPIH indexing. 
 
 
 
 
9 I am indebted to CEPA for their useful time series of regulatory decisions 
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TABLE 1 
Estimated real WACCs for Sizewell B’s RAB model (RPI based unless noted) 
        ERP 4% ERP 6%     
        gearing 65% gearing 55% 
Energy vanilla 
WACCs 
period 
starting 
risk free 
rate 
debt 
premium 
debt 
cost CoE WACC CoE WACC DCPR Other*** 
Jan-95 3.84% 1.00% 4.84% 7.84% 5.89% 9.84% 7.09% 7.00%* 5.76% 
Jan-00 3.05% 1.00% 4.05% 7.05% 5.10% 9.05% 6.30% 5.15% 5.05% 
Jan-05 2.18% 1.00% 3.18% 6.18% 4.23% 8.18% 5.43% 5.50% 5.50% 
Jan-10 1.47% 1.25% 2.72% 5.47% 3.69% 7.47% 4.86% 4.70% 5.00% 
Jan-15 -0.23% 1.50% 1.27% 3.77% 2.14% 5.77% 3.29% 3.76% 3.44% 
Jan-20 -1.47% 1.50% 0.03% 2.53% 0.90% 4.53% 2.05% 1.81%** 1.96%** 
*  Pre-tax; vanilla would be lower 
** Working assumptions for RIIO-GD2 and T2 WACCs based on CPIH (Ofgem, May 2019) 
*** Utilities such as water, transmission, gas, to the nearest starting date 
3. CARBON SAVED 
In the counterfactual in which SZB is not built, other forms of generation would be needed to 
replace its output, with its associated emissions. Figure 4 shows generation by fuel from well 
before privatization (and commissioning SZB).  
 
FIGURE 3  
Generation by fuel, 1970-2018 
Source: DUKES 5.1 
Starting in 1995, gas-fired CCGTs started to enter, mostly on the back of favourable 
long-term contracts with the newly privatized Public Electricity Suppliers (PESs, the 
successors to the Area Boards). It seems likely that the CCGTs would have entered at least as 
quickly without SZB, in response to the need for new capacity and the very favourable 
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contracts they were able to sign with the PESs, so the counterfactual would likely have had 
more coal generation, which was clearly declining in response to increased nuclear output, 
higher imports (enjoying a non-fossil fuel benefit) and CCGT output.  
The relative variable costs (variable O&M plus fuel costs)10 are shown in figure 5 
with and without any GB carbon costs, together with the day-ahead wholesale price.  
 
FIGURE 5 
Avoidable costs of coal and CCGTs and wholesale price, 1995-2018 
Source: Price data as fig.1, fuel costs: BEIS Quarterly Energy Prices Table 3.2.1 
 
In the period before retail prices were liberalised (1998-2000) the avoidable gas cost 
was slightly above the avoidable coal cost, but the contract position with the PESs probably 
meant they were dispatched before coal. Oil prices were consistently above coal prices and so 
oil is primarily used for peaking plant, and would likely continue in that role until displaced 
by gas. Thus from 1995 to 2000 each MWh generated by SZB would displace the carbon 
content of 1 MWh of coal generation, which gradually rose from 0.82t CO2/MWh to 0.87t 
CO2/MWh.  
Between 2000 and 2005, during which period competition was intensifying with plant 
divestment from the two major generators (National Power and PowerGen) and the move to 
an energy-only market (NETA), coal costs were below gas costs, favouring running coal on 
base load. The decline in coal burn seems to have ceased during this period although CCGT 
production increased.  
Figure 6 shows the plant load factors (running hours as a percent of annual hours) for 
coal, CCGT and nuclear. CCGT load factors are falling from 1999 to 2006 while coal is 
rising, partly because of the retirement of inefficient coal plant and hence lower coal capacity. 
 
10 Costs are calculated from the price of fuels into major generators (DUKES, table 5.1) and the efficiencies of 
coal and CCGTs (from DUKES 5.10). 
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FIGURE 6 
UK Plant load factors and thermal efficiencies, 1996-2018 
Source: DUKES, Table 5.10 
 
After 1999 CCGT had a less secure place with the PES’s, with the end of the 
domestic franchise and with it their guaranteed market, and coal would likely run on baseload 
while CCGTs moved to mid-merit and peaking. Nevertheless, the pressure to retire coal plant 
might have been lower had SZB not been commissioned, so while some of the time SZB 
replaced gas, it may also have displaced some baseload coal. We assume that the generation 
displaced is 50:50 coal and gas. 
From 2006 with the introduction of first the EU Emissions Trading System (for CO2) 
ETS and later the GB Carbon Price Support (an additional carbon tax on generation fuels), 
the carbon-inclusive cost of coal was almost always above that of gas, making coal the 
marginal fuel unless constrained by its capacity (often the case for hours of higher demand). 
If these occur half the time, then again the generation displaced is 50:50 coal and gas. Thus 
from 2006 to 2019 the displacement is roughly 0.63 tonnes CO2/MWh (the falling efficiency 
of coal generation is almost exactly offset by the rising efficiency of gas). (Chyong et al. 
2019, sets out a more sophisticated method used for measuring the displacement factor of 
wind but that would require calibrating a counterfactual plant mix back to 1996.) 
4. MODELLING THE COST OF CARBON SAVED 
We assume the starting value of the Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) in 1995 is the final 
construction cost at 1995 prices. Section 3 gave that as £19952,550/kW. In the event, SZB did 
not produce a positive daily supply to the grid until 1 June 1995 and this will be taken as the 
start date for revenue recovery. For the previous six months the cost of electricity taken was 
£2.1 million (or £2/kW), which is small enough to ignore, so we take the opening RAB as 
£2,550 for the rest of the first year, as shown in Table 2.  
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TABLE 2 
Building blocks for the capex to be recovered each year in prices of that year  
 start £/kW 
end of 
year WACC  
capex 
£/MWh opex 
strike price 
£/MWh 
year RAB Deprec RAB Low High Low High £/MWh Low high 
1995 £2,550 £75.7 £2,474 5.89% 7.09% £30.7 £34.9 £12.7 £43.5 £47.6 
1996 £2,527 £77.9 £2,521 5.89% 7.09% £30.9 £35.0 £13.1 £44.0 £48.1 
1997 £2,521 £80.8 £2,532 5.89% 7.09% £31.2 £35.3 £13.6 £44.8 £48.9 
1998 £2,532 £81.9 £2,483 5.89% 7.09% £31.4 £35.6 £13.8 £45.2 £49.4 
1999 £2,483 £84.7 £2,478 5.89% 7.09% £31.4 £35.5 £14.3 £45.7 £49.7 
2000 £2,478 £86.3 £2,438 5.10% 6.30% £28.9 £33.0 £14.5 £43.5 £47.5 
2001 £2,438 £87.2 £2,375 5.10% 6.30% £28.8 £32.8 £14.7 £43.5 £47.4 
2002 £2,375 £89.7 £2,351 5.10% 6.30% £28.7 £32.6 £15.1 £43.8 £47.7 
2003 £2,351 £92.4 £2,327 5.10% 6.30% £28.9 £32.7 £15.6 £44.5 £48.3 
2004 £2,327 £95.1 £2,297 5.10% 6.30% £29.1 £32.9 £16.0 £45.1 £48.9 
2005 £2,297 £98.2 £2,271 4.23% 5.43% £26.6 £30.3 £16.5 £43.1 £46.9 
2006 £2,271 £102.6 £2,264 4.23% 5.43% £27.0 £30.7 £17.3 £44.3 £48.0 
2007 £2,264 £107.3 £2,256 4.23% 5.43% £27.6 £31.3 £18.1 £45.7 £49.4 
2008 £2,256 £105.6 £2,116 4.23% 5.43% £27.3 £31.0 £17.8 £45.1 £48.8 
2009 £2,116 £110.9 £2,106 4.23% 5.43% £27.3 £30.7 £18.7 £45.9 £49.4 
2010 £2,106 £116.4 £2,088 3.69% 4.86% £26.4 £29.8 £19.6 £46.0 £49.4 
2011 £2,088 £120.1 £2,031 3.69% 4.86% £26.8 £30.1 £20.2 £47.0 £50.4 
2012 £2,031 £123.7 £1,965 3.69% 4.86% £27.0 £30.3 £20.8 £47.9 £51.1 
2013 £1,965 £126.7 £1,882 3.69% 4.86% £27.1 £30.2 £21.3 £48.4 £51.6 
2014 £1,882 £127.9 £1,771 3.69% 4.86% £26.9 £29.8 £21.8 £48.6 £51.6 
2015 £1,771 £130.2 £1,670 2.14% 3.29% £22.9 £25.6 £22.0 £44.9 £47.6 
2016 £1,670 £131.1 £1,550 2.14% 3.29% £22.7 £25.3 £22.2 £44.9 £47.5 
2017 £1,550 £134.6 £1,453 2.14% 3.29% £22.8 £25.3 £22.7 £45.6 £48.0 
2018 £1,453 £137.9 £1,347 2.14% 3.29% £20.7 £23.0 £23.3 £44.0 £46.3 
2019 £1,347 £139.8 £1,225 2.14% 3.29% £20.1 £22.2 £23.6 £43.7 £45.8 
2020 £1,225     0.90% 2.05%           
Note: values are uprated each year by the appropriate price index inflator (RPI until 2016, 
thereafter CPIH) 
 
One further modification is needed to take account of the capacity auctions held from 
2014. The capacity payments compensated plant for availability in stress periods, and SZB 
received payments for electricity years 2018/19 and 2019/20, effectively reducing the cost to 
be recovered from the RAB. The wholesale price fell, increasing the costs of the CfD, and so 
it is logical to reduce the RAB by the annual capacity payments. The first auction cleared at 
£201219.4/kWyr =£201822.5/kWyr. The second auction cleared at £201418/kWyr = 
£201920.3/kWyr. These are deducted from the annual value of capex in Table 2. 
Each year the RAB is decreased by depreciation of 1/35 of the initial RAB, or 
£199575/kW, and the costs to be recovered from the sales contract is WACCt x RABt uprated 
each year by the RPI (until 2016, after which the uprating is by the CPIH). Table 2 below 
shows the capex building blocks set at the quinquennial price controls, which are rolled 
forward each year with the relevant price inflator. A low and high value for the WACC is 
taken from Table 1 (the two columns headed “WACC”). The next step is to determine the de-
rating factor for SZB, which has a capacity factor of 84%. This is equivalent to full 7,358 hrs, 
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taken as 7,350, over which the capex needs to be recovered. If K is the capex in £/kWyr, then 
the allowable capex is K/7.35 /MWh, shown in the right hand columns in Table 2. The de-
rating implies that SZB, which has a nominal rated capacity of 1,198 MW is 1,006 MW, but 
taken here as 1,000 MW (83.5% capacity factor). The strike price is then set as the capex (a 
low and a high value for the low and high WACCs) plus the opex calculated above as 
£201522/MWh and shown in the right hand columns of Table 2.  
 
TABLE 3 
Annual real values of deficit and displaced CO2 
  Output/yr   displaced displaced 
deficit/yr including 
CO2 value 
  GWh/yr mart price CO2/MWh 
CO2 
Mt/yr £(2019) million 
year   £/MWh tonnes/MWh   Low High 
1995 5,307 £23.2 0.82 4.16 £146 £179 
1996 8,434 £23.2 0.82 6.94 £269 £323 
1997 8,432 £24.5 0.82 6.94 £271 £324 
1998 10,166 £24.7 0.82 8.36 £317 £381 
1999 8,211 £24.6 0.82 6.75 £245 £294 
2000 7,129 £23.5 0.82 5.86 £213 £256 
2001 9,220 £19.6 0.63 5.81 £343 £397 
2002 9,193 £15.2 0.62 5.72 £381 £433 
2003 8,884 £18.2 0.62 5.53 £338 £387 
2004 9,329 £21.4 0.63 5.82 £306 £356 
2005 8,691 £36.4 0.63 5.50 £160 £205 
2006 8,908 £39.0 0.64 5.67 £143 £188 
2007 10,262 £28.4 0.63 6.49 £239 £289 
2008 9,273 £68.8 0.63 5.83 -£118 -£75 
2009 9,095 £37.0 0.63 5.71 £193 £232 
2010 4,724 £41.7 0.62 2.95 £55 £74 
2011 8,656 £47.8 0.62 5.40 £64 £97 
2012 9,375 £45.2 0.63 5.88 £69 £103 
2013 8,715 £54.9 0.63 5.45 -£29 £1 
2014 8,828 £42.1 0.63 5.53 £141 £170 
2015 10,507 £40.0 0.63 6.58 £208 £240 
2016 8,627 £38.9 0.63 5.44 £176 £200 
2017 8,834 £51.7 0.63 5.59 £177 £199 
2018 9,383 £57.4 0.64 6.02 £73 £95 
2019 5,828 £43.9 0.64 3.73 £138 £150 
Total 
£2019 214,009     144 £4,517 £5,499 
per  undiscounted     £31.4 £38.3 
tonne  at WACC     £34.1 £49.2 
 CO2 at 3%       £33.3 £40.4 
Source: From Table 2  
The consumer payment is the excess (possibly negative) of the strike price over the 
wholesale price, for each of SZB’s actual operating hours. Annual CO2 emissions can 
similarly be calculated for each of SZB’s actual operating hours. These revenue shortfall 
estimates are based on the actual wholesale price that has been inflated by the carbon price, 
so the price already includes some carbon benefit. The simplest way to recognise this is to 
multiply the CO2 displaced by the total carbon price and add this back to the shortfall in 
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revenue. The costs to consumers per tonne saved can now be calculated in £(2019) and are 
shown in Table 3.  
The undiscounted cost is £201931.4/tonne CO2 at the low strike price and £201938.3/t. 
CO2 at the high strike price. Accumulating the costs and CO2 savings forward at the relevant 
WACCs (as with the method of levelizing costs) gives £201934.1/t. CO2 at the low strike price 
and £201949.2/t. CO2 at the high WACC. Levelizing at a constant discount rate of 3% gives 
slightly lower values as more recent costs have been falling as the RAB is depreciated and the 
WACC falls. The 2019 carbon charges on GB electricity are about £40/t. CO2, made up of 
the EUA price and the Carbon Price Support (of £18/t CO2). If we were to roll forward the 
contract to 2030 after which SZB could sell on the wholesale market the required future 
subsidy would likely be negative (relative to the actual wholesale price), further reducing the 
lifetime cost of abating CO2 from the original investment, and demonstrating that, compared 
to presumably what is now thought to be a not excessive carbon tax, SZB was cost-effective.  
5. A COUNTERFACTUAL FOLLOW-ON NUCLEAR FLEET 
Britain abandoned its nuclear aspirations with privatization, but it is interesting to speculate 
what might have happened if that ambition had been at least partially realised. Since then EdF 
has started constructing the 3.2 GW Hinkley Point C (HPC) station and is pressing for 
approval for another identical station at Sizewell C (SZC). The latest cost estimate for HPC 
has risen from its earlier investment decision budget of  about £20 billion or £20166,250 
(FOAK) to perhaps £201922 bn, or £20166,535/kW, as a result of “challenging ground 
conditions”.11 SZC was originally estimated to be 20% cheaper than the original budget, or 
£20165,000/kW for a second of a kind. BEIS (2016a) and NIC (2020b) estimate future nuclear 
capital costs at £20164,182/kW.
12 
If instead we had built follow-on copies of the original SZB, at a discount of 25% 
(based on PIU and Collier’s follow-on costs) of the FOAK of £19952,550/kW (i.e. £19951,912), 
the cost in comparable terms would be £20162,900/kW (uprating by the CPI) or £20164,370 
(uprating by the less reliable Construction Price Index). Taking the lower figure, a follow-on 
series of 6.4 GW of SZB design might have cost £201618.6 bn compared to the predicted cost 
of HPC and SZC of around £201637 bn, a saving of about £18 bn. At the higher rolled forward 
cost of SZB the follow-on cost would be about £201628 bn and the cost saving still £9 bn. 
An alternative way of evaluating SZB is to compare its levelized follow-on cost of 
£20162,900/kW over an assumed 60-year life at a WACC of 3% real (reflecting more recent 
interest rates) of £36.7/MWh with the cost of an efficient CCGT over its 25-year life at the 
same 3% WACC and a carbon price of £40/tonne. Depending on the estimated range of 2020 
capital costs from BEIS (2016b) and future gas prices ranging from a low of £15/MWhth to 
£35/MWhth the levelized costs would range from £50-70/MWh. 
 
11 https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-09-25/edf-raises-cost-of-flagship-u-k-nuclear-
project-warns-of-delay  
12 Figures are in £2016 to allow comparison with those in BEIS (2016) and NIC (2020b). 
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6. A SHORT-CUT ESTIMATE 
Rather than laboriously working through the daily outputs, prices and emissions abated, it is 
useful to ask if there is a short-cut way of calculating the cost per tonne CO2 saved. Given the 
capital cost, k, of per kW in £2019 (uprating first by the RPI to 2016 and then by the CPIH to 
2019, as with the Ofgem inflator) it is simple to compute the annual capex at a WACC of r, 
as rk/(1-(1+r)-35) = θk in £/kWyr. This can be expressed in £/MWh if the capacity factor is f 
by setting h = 8.76f to give capex as θk/h. If the total cost (fuel + fixed and variable O&M) is 
v/MWh, the CO2 displaced in t/MWh is e, and the average wholesale price is p (all in £2019) 
then the average cost per tonne CO2 saved is (v + θ(r)k/h - p)/e. For SZB, v = £201923.72, k = 
£20195,170/kW, p = £201943.47 (historic average), and h = 7.35. 
 
FIGURE 7 
Relationship between cost of CO2 abated and WACC allowed 
 
Figure 7 shows the results for the historic average wholesale price (in £2019), and for 
various constant real wholesale prices, together with the two average values of the WACCs 
(vertical lines) used in the calculations. The results at the Low Ofgem WACC is £37.7/tonne 
and at the Ofgem High WACC is £47.2/t, close to the correctly computed values. 
7. CONCLUSIONS 
Britain originally planned a nuclear power programme, partly in response to Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher’s concern over the environment and global warming (HMSO, 1990). This 
became very clear when on November 8, 198913 she told the UN: “What we are now doing to 
the world, by degrading the land surfaces, by polluting the waters and by adding greenhouse 
gases to the air at an unprecedented rate - all this is new in the experience of the earth. It is 
 
13 Reported on the BBC at https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-22069768  
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mankind and his activities that are changing the environment of our planet in damaging and 
dangerous ways.” Perhaps her more pressing reason was to reduce the UK’s dependence on 
coal-fired generation and in turn its dependence on the coal miners’ union. That same year 
the Thatcher Government announced a programme of ten new PWR reactors (Taylor, 2016, 
p22), of which Sizewell B is to date the only one commissioned, a programme certainly 
brought to an end with the privatization of the CEGB and the realisation that the nuclear 
power plants were at that time unsaleable to the private sector (at least without the kind of 
long-term contract examined here). 
This paper has asked whether Sizewell B (SZB) was a cost-effective way of abating 
CO2, and specifically, what it cost per tonne of CO2 abated by displacing fossil generation. 
The assumption on which this calculation is based is that without an adequate carbon price, 
new nuclear power was not commercially viable. Just as other zero-carbon renewables 
required contractual support, SZB would have required a long-term contract at above market 
prices. The simplest such contract would be a long-term Contract-for-Difference (CfD) with 
the terms periodically revisited in quinquennial price controls under the Regulatory Asset 
Base model of the privatised utilities. With some further assumptions about the carbon saved 
per MWh of SZB generation it is then possible to estimate the amount of implicit subsidy 
required to abate this displaced CO2. The answer depends on the Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital (WACC) used by the regulator (now Ofgem) in setting the strike price in the CfDs. 
At each date there are a range of observed WACCs set for different utilities, depending on 
their gearing and risk. 
At a low value of the WACC the cost is £201934.1/tonne CO2 abated and £201949.2/t. 
CO2 at the high WACC, compared to the roughly £40/t. CO2 paid by GB generators in 2019, 
which is presumably now thought to be a not excessive carbon price. While it is difficult to 
estimate the cost of carbon saved by renewables, as a large part of the required subsidy was to 
pay for learning spill-overs (Newbery, 2018), it seems likely that nuclear power was a 
cheaper form of carbon abatement, at least until very recently (when some renewables 
proposals claim to be subsidy-free). It is certainly cheaper than the levelized cost of the 
cheapest unabated fossil alternative, CCGTs paying the £40/t. CO2 cost. 
The other striking observation is that the full cost of SZB (including FOAK costs) at 
£20194,290/kW is less than the £5,000/kW estimated for the proposed second EPR planned for 
Sizewell C (itself 20% less than the FOAK budget for Hinkley Point C). As SZC has not yet 
been built, the £5,000/kW remains an estimate, and indeed one that the National 
Infrastructure Commission (2019) considered with some scepticism. If (and it is a big if, 
given the difficulty of retaining the construction and engineering expertise until needed) 
instead Britain had built both Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C at the cost of a Nth-of-a-kind 
PWR, the saving would have been £20169-18 billion. 
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Appendix A TNUOS Generation tariffs 
 
Table A1 shows the annual grid transmission charges for the zone in which Sizewell B (SZB) 
is located, and the average for all zones. Arguably it is the relative connection cost that is 
required to compare generation costs at SZB with other stations, and this is normally 
negative, meaning that SZB is better placed for delivering power than more distant 
generation, notably in Scotland, but generally north of North Wales and Yorkshire. Over time 
the zonal boundaries and the methodology have changed several times.  
 
Table A1       £/kWyr  £2015/kWyr 
Year starting 
1 April SZB Average SZB-Av CPI SZB real SZB-Av 
1994 £1.056 £1.133 -£0.077 65.4 £1.62 -£0.12 
1995 £1.352 £0.672 £0.680 67.2 £2.01 £1.01 
1996 £1.637 £0.837 £0.800 68.8 £2.38 £1.16 
           
2005 £1.323 £7.106 -£5.783 78.1 £1.69 -£7.40 
2006 £1.219 £6.614 -£5.395 79.9 £1.53 -£6.75 
2007 £1.974 £6.526 -£4.552 81.8 £2.41 -£5.57 
2008 £2.317 £7.712 -£5.395 84.7 £2.74 -£6.37 
2009 £2.111 £7.444 -£5.334 86.6 £2.44 -£6.16 
2010 £1.936 £0.758 £1.178 89.4 £2.17 £1.32 
2011 £1.564 £7.638 -£6.074 93.4 £1.67 -£6.50 
2012 £2.393 £7.543 -£5.150 96.1 £2.49 -£5.36 
2013 £2.443 £10.078 -£7.635 98.5 £2.48 -£7.75 
2014 £3.548 £11.463 -£7.915 100.0 £3.55 -£7.92 
2015 £2.089 £10.116 -£8.027 100.0 £2.09 -£8.03 
2016 £2.346 £5.734 -£3.388 100.7 £2.33 -£3.36 
2017 -£0.150 £8.573 -£8.723 103.6 -£0.14 -£8.42 
2018 -£2.561 £6.107 -£8.668 105.9 -£2.42 -£8.19 
2019 -£2.600 £8.981 -£11.581 107.8 -£2.41 -£10.74 
2020 -£3.200 £8.544 -£11.744 110.0 -£2.91 -£10.68 
2021 -£4.320 £8.318 -£12.638 112.2 -£3.85 -£11.27 
2022 -£6.930 £7.224 -£14.154 114.4 -£6.06 -£12.37 
2023 -£8.850 £5.657 -£14.507 116.7 -£7.58 -£12.43 
average 
1994-2019 £1.336 £5.174 -£3.838   £1.69 -£4.07 
 
Source: National Grid, then NGESO 
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Appendix B 
 
Table B1 US data on nuclear generation costs from existing utilities 
      O&M fuel total 
Year $/£ 
CPI UK 
inflator 
£2018/MWh     
2007 2.00 1.27 £9.73 £3.17 £12.90 
2008 1.85 1.23 £10.67 £3.51 £14.18 
2009 1.57 1.20 £12.57 £4.11 £16.68 
2010 1.55 1.18 £13.15 £5.08 £18.23 
2011 1.60 1.13 £12.49 £4.95 £17.43 
2012 1.59 1.10 £13.79 £5.30 £19.08 
2013 1.56 1.08 £13.20 £5.61 £18.81 
2014 1.65 1.06 £12.31 £4.98 £17.29 
2015 1.53 1.06 £12.63 £5.18 £17.81 
2016 1.35 1.05 £13.96 £5.81 £19.76 
2017 1.29 1.02 £13.44 £5.94 £19.38 
    average £12.54 £4.88 £17.41 
US EIA data at https://www.eia.gov/electricity/annual/html/epa_08_04.html 
